Benachrichtigungen: Web Push und E-Mail als Kanaele der Automatiken

Neuer BenachrichtigungTransport hinter der Aktor-URL "Benachrichtigung":
push schickt an alle angemeldeten Geraete (homeMesh.push_abos), mail ueber
den SMTP-Zugang aus der config.ini. Ein Abo, das der Push-Dienst mit 404
oder 410 ablehnt, wird geloescht statt weiter angeschrieben.

Daneben hoert der Runner auf benachrichtigung/# - darueber schickt die
Probe aus den Einstellungen, ohne dass die Weboberflaeche verschluesseln
muesste. Zugestellt wird im Haupttakt, nicht im MQTT-Faden.

pywebpush, py_vapid und http_ece liegen wie die uebrigen Fremdpakete im
Ordner, nicht in site-packages; transports.py haengt ihn an den Suchpfad.
Das Schluesselpaar erzeugt vapid_erzeugen.py und bleibt ausserhalb des Git.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-09-21 08:37:08 +02:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent 0a37d8d763
commit 35382a6ae1
29 changed files with 4985 additions and 5 deletions
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import functools
import os
import struct
from cryptography.exceptions import InvalidTag
from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.hkdf import HKDF
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms, modes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import Encoding, PublicFormat
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
MAX_RECORD_SIZE = pow(2, 31) - 1
MIN_RECORD_SIZE = 3
KEY_LENGTH = 16
NONCE_LENGTH = 12
TAG_LENGTH = 16
# Valid content types (ordered from newest, to most obsolete)
versions = {
"aes128gcm": {"pad": 1},
"aesgcm": {"pad": 2},
"aesgcm128": {"pad": 1},
}
class ECEException(Exception):
"""Exception for ECE encryption functions"""
def __init__(self, message):
self.message = message
def derive_key(
mode, version, salt, key, private_key, dh, auth_secret, keyid, keylabel="P-256"
):
"""Derive the encryption key
:param mode: operational mode (encrypt or decrypt)
:type mode: enumerate('encrypt', 'decrypt)
:param salt: encryption salt value
:type salt: str
:param key: raw key
:type key: str
:param private_key: DH private key
:type key: object
:param dh: Diffie Helman public key value
:type dh: str
:param keyid: key identifier label
:type keyid: str
:param keylabel: label for aesgcm/aesgcm128
:type keylabel: str
:param auth_secret: authorization secret
:type auth_secret: str
:param version: Content Type identifier
:type version: enumerate('aes128gcm', 'aesgcm', 'aesgcm128')
"""
context = b""
keyinfo = ""
nonceinfo = ""
def build_info(base, info_context):
return b"Content-Encoding: " + base + b"\0" + info_context
def derive_dh(mode, version, private_key, dh, keylabel):
def length_prefix(key):
return struct.pack("!H", len(key)) + key
if isinstance(dh, ec.EllipticCurvePublicKey):
pubkey = dh
dh = dh.public_bytes(Encoding.X962, PublicFormat.UncompressedPoint)
else:
pubkey = ec.EllipticCurvePublicKey.from_encoded_point(ec.SECP256R1(), dh)
encoded = private_key.public_key().public_bytes(
Encoding.X962, PublicFormat.UncompressedPoint
)
if mode == "encrypt":
sender_pub_key = encoded
receiver_pub_key = dh
else:
sender_pub_key = dh
receiver_pub_key = encoded
if version == "aes128gcm":
context = b"WebPush: info\x00" + receiver_pub_key + sender_pub_key
else:
context = (
keylabel.encode("utf-8")
+ b"\0"
+ length_prefix(receiver_pub_key)
+ length_prefix(sender_pub_key)
)
return private_key.exchange(ec.ECDH(), pubkey), context
if version not in versions:
raise ECEException("Invalid version")
if mode not in ["encrypt", "decrypt"]:
raise ECEException("unknown 'mode' specified: " + mode)
if salt is None or len(salt) != KEY_LENGTH:
raise ECEException("'salt' must be a 16 octet value")
if dh is not None:
if private_key is None:
raise ECEException("DH requires a private_key")
(secret, context) = derive_dh(
mode=mode,
version=version,
private_key=private_key,
dh=dh,
keylabel=keylabel,
)
else:
secret = key
if secret is None:
raise ECEException("unable to determine the secret")
if version == "aesgcm":
keyinfo = build_info(b"aesgcm", context)
nonceinfo = build_info(b"nonce", context)
elif version == "aesgcm128":
keyinfo = b"Content-Encoding: aesgcm128"
nonceinfo = b"Content-Encoding: nonce"
elif version == "aes128gcm":
keyinfo = b"Content-Encoding: aes128gcm\x00"
nonceinfo = b"Content-Encoding: nonce\x00"
if dh is None:
# Only mix the authentication secret when using DH for aes128gcm
auth_secret = None
if auth_secret is not None:
if version == "aes128gcm":
info = context
else:
info = build_info(b"auth", b"")
hkdf_auth = HKDF(
algorithm=hashes.SHA256(),
length=32,
salt=auth_secret,
info=info,
backend=default_backend(),
)
secret = hkdf_auth.derive(secret)
hkdf_key = HKDF(
algorithm=hashes.SHA256(),
length=KEY_LENGTH,
salt=salt,
info=keyinfo,
backend=default_backend(),
)
hkdf_nonce = HKDF(
algorithm=hashes.SHA256(),
length=NONCE_LENGTH,
salt=salt,
info=nonceinfo,
backend=default_backend(),
)
return hkdf_key.derive(secret), hkdf_nonce.derive(secret)
def iv(base, counter):
"""Generate an initialization vector."""
if (counter >> 64) != 0:
raise ECEException("Counter too big")
(mask,) = struct.unpack("!Q", base[4:])
return base[:4] + struct.pack("!Q", counter ^ mask)
def decrypt(
content,
salt=None,
key=None,
private_key=None,
dh=None,
auth_secret=None,
keyid=None,
keylabel="P-256",
rs=4096,
version="aes128gcm",
):
"""
Decrypt a data block
:param content: Data to be decrypted
:type content: str
:param salt: Encryption salt
:type salt: str
:param key: local public key
:type key: str
:param private_key: DH private key
:type key: object
:param keyid: Internal key identifier for private key info
:type keyid: str
:param dh: Remote Diffie Hellman sequence (omit for aes128gcm)
:type dh: str
:param rs: Record size
:type rs: int
:param auth_secret: Authorization secret
:type auth_secret: str
:param version: ECE Method version
:type version: enumerate('aes128gcm', 'aesgcm', 'aesgcm128')
:return: Decrypted message content
:rtype str
"""
def parse_content_header(content):
"""Parse an aes128gcm content body and extract the header values.
:param content: The encrypted body of the message
:type content: str
"""
id_len = struct.unpack("!B", content[20:21])[0]
return {
"salt": content[:16],
"rs": struct.unpack("!L", content[16:20])[0],
"keyid": content[21 : 21 + id_len],
"content": content[21 + id_len :],
}
def decrypt_record(key, nonce, counter, content):
decryptor = Cipher(
algorithms.AES(key),
modes.GCM(iv(nonce, counter), tag=content[-TAG_LENGTH:]),
backend=default_backend(),
).decryptor()
return decryptor.update(content[:-TAG_LENGTH]) + decryptor.finalize()
def unpad_legacy(data):
pad_size = versions[version]["pad"]
pad = functools.reduce(
lambda x, y: x << 8 | y,
struct.unpack("!" + ("B" * pad_size), data[0:pad_size]),
)
if pad_size + pad > len(data) or data[pad_size : pad_size + pad] != (
b"\x00" * pad
):
raise ECEException("Bad padding")
return data[pad_size + pad :]
def unpad(data, last):
i = len(data) - 1
for i in range(len(data) - 1, -1, -1):
v = struct.unpack("B", data[i : i + 1])[0]
if v != 0:
if not last and v != 1:
raise ECEException("record delimiter != 1")
if last and v != 2:
raise ECEException("last record delimiter != 2")
return data[0:i]
raise ECEException("all zero record plaintext")
if version not in versions:
raise ECEException("Invalid version")
overhead = versions[version]["pad"]
if version == "aes128gcm":
try:
content_header = parse_content_header(content)
except Exception:
raise ECEException("Could not parse the content header")
salt = content_header["salt"]
rs = content_header["rs"]
keyid = content_header["keyid"]
if private_key is not None and not dh:
dh = keyid
else:
keyid = keyid.decode("utf-8")
content = content_header["content"]
overhead += 16
(key_, nonce_) = derive_key(
"decrypt",
version=version,
salt=salt,
key=key,
private_key=private_key,
dh=dh,
auth_secret=auth_secret,
keyid=keyid,
keylabel=keylabel,
)
if rs <= overhead:
raise ECEException("Record size too small")
chunk = rs
if version != "aes128gcm":
chunk += 16 # account for tags in old versions
if len(content) % chunk == 0:
raise ECEException("Message truncated")
result = b""
counter = 0
try:
for i in list(range(0, len(content), chunk)):
data = decrypt_record(key_, nonce_, counter, content[i : i + chunk])
if version == "aes128gcm":
last = (i + chunk) >= len(content)
result += unpad(data, last)
else:
result += unpad_legacy(data)
counter += 1
except InvalidTag as ex:
raise ECEException("Decryption error: {}".format(repr(ex)))
return result
def encrypt(
content,
salt=None,
key=None,
private_key=None,
dh=None,
auth_secret=None,
keyid=None,
keylabel="P-256",
rs=4096,
version="aes128gcm",
):
"""
Encrypt a data block
:param content: block of data to encrypt
:type content: str
:param salt: Encryption salt
:type salt: str
:param key: Encryption key data
:type key: str
:param private_key: DH private key
:type key: object
:param keyid: Internal key identifier for private key info
:type keyid: str
:param dh: Remote Diffie Hellman sequence
:type dh: str
:param rs: Record size
:type rs: int
:param auth_secret: Authorization secret
:type auth_secret: str
:param version: ECE Method version
:type version: enumerate('aes128gcm', 'aesgcm', 'aesgcm128')
:return: Encrypted message content
:rtype str
"""
def encrypt_record(key, nonce, counter, buf, last):
encryptor = Cipher(
algorithms.AES(key),
modes.GCM(iv(nonce, counter)),
backend=default_backend(),
).encryptor()
if version == "aes128gcm":
data = encryptor.update(buf + (b"\x02" if last else b"\x01"))
else:
data = encryptor.update((b"\x00" * versions[version]["pad"]) + buf)
data += encryptor.finalize()
data += encryptor.tag
return data
def compose_aes128gcm(salt, content, rs, keyid):
"""Compose the header and content of an aes128gcm encrypted
message body
:param salt: The sender's salt value
:type salt: str
:param content: The encrypted body of the message
:type content: str
:param rs: Override for the content length
:type rs: int
:param keyid: The keyid to use for this message
:type keyid: str
"""
if len(keyid) > 255:
raise ECEException("keyid is too long")
header = salt
if rs > MAX_RECORD_SIZE:
raise ECEException("Too much content")
header += struct.pack("!L", rs)
header += struct.pack("!B", len(keyid))
header += keyid
return header + content
if version not in versions:
raise ECEException("Invalid version")
if salt is None:
salt = os.urandom(16)
(key_, nonce_) = derive_key(
"encrypt",
version=version,
salt=salt,
key=key,
private_key=private_key,
dh=dh,
auth_secret=auth_secret,
keyid=keyid,
keylabel=keylabel,
)
overhead = versions[version]["pad"]
if version == "aes128gcm":
overhead += 16
end = len(content)
else:
end = len(content) + 1
if rs <= overhead:
raise ECEException("Record size too small")
chunk_size = rs - overhead
result = b""
counter = 0
# the extra one on the loop ensures that we produce a padding only
# record if the data length is an exact multiple of the chunk size
for i in list(range(0, end, chunk_size)):
result += encrypt_record(
key_, nonce_, counter, content[i : i + chunk_size], (i + chunk_size) >= end
)
counter += 1
if version == "aes128gcm":
if keyid is None and private_key is not None:
kid = private_key.public_key().public_bytes(
Encoding.X962, PublicFormat.UncompressedPoint
)
else:
kid = (keyid or "").encode("utf-8")
return compose_aes128gcm(salt, result, rs, keyid=kid)
return result
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import base64
import json
import os
import struct
import unittest
from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import Encoding, PublicFormat
from pytest import raises
import http_ece as ece
from http_ece import ECEException
TEST_VECTORS = os.path.join(os.sep, "..", "encrypt_data.json")[1:]
def logmsg(arg):
"""
print(arg)
"""
return
def logbuf(msg, buf):
"""used for debugging test code."""
if buf is None:
buf = b""
logmsg(msg + ": [" + str(len(buf)) + "]")
for i in list(range(0, len(buf), 48)):
logmsg(" " + repr(buf[i : i + 48]))
return
def b64e(arg):
if arg is None:
return None
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(arg).decode()
def b64d(arg):
if arg is None:
return None
return base64.urlsafe_b64decode(str(arg) + "===="[: len(arg) % 4 :])
def make_key():
return ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1(), default_backend())
class TestEce(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self):
self.private_key = make_key()
self.dh = self.private_key.public_key().public_bytes(
Encoding.X962, PublicFormat.UncompressedPoint
)
self.m_key = os.urandom(16)
self.m_salt = os.urandom(16)
def test_derive_key_invalid_mode(self):
with raises(ECEException) as ex:
ece.derive_key(
"invalid",
version="aes128gcm",
salt=self.m_salt,
key=self.m_key,
private_key=self.private_key,
dh=None,
auth_secret=None,
keyid="valid",
)
assert ex.value.message == "unknown 'mode' specified: invalid"
def test_derive_key_invalid_salt(self):
with raises(ECEException) as ex:
ece.derive_key(
"encrypt",
version="aes128gcm",
salt=None,
key=self.m_key,
private_key=self.private_key,
dh=None,
auth_secret=None,
keyid="valid",
)
assert ex.value.message == "'salt' must be a 16 octet value"
def test_derive_key_invalid_version(self):
with raises(ECEException) as ex:
ece.derive_key(
"encrypt",
version="invalid",
salt=self.m_salt,
key=None,
private_key=self.private_key,
dh=None,
auth_secret=None,
keyid="valid",
)
assert ex.value.message == "Invalid version"
def test_derive_key_no_private_key(self):
with raises(ECEException) as ex:
ece.derive_key(
"encrypt",
version="aes128gcm",
salt=self.m_salt,
key=None,
private_key=None,
dh=self.dh,
auth_secret=None,
keyid="valid",
)
assert ex.value.message == "DH requires a private_key"
def test_derive_key_no_secret(self):
with raises(ECEException) as ex:
ece.derive_key(
"encrypt",
version="aes128gcm",
salt=self.m_salt,
key=None,
private_key=None,
dh=None,
auth_secret=None,
keyid="valid",
)
assert ex.value.message == "unable to determine the secret"
def test_iv_bad_counter(self):
with raises(ECEException) as ex:
ece.iv(os.urandom(8), pow(2, 64) + 1)
assert ex.value.message == "Counter too big"
class TestEceChecking(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self):
self.m_key = os.urandom(16)
self.m_input = os.urandom(5)
# This header is specific to the padding tests, but can be used
# elsewhere
self.m_header = b"\xaa\xd2\x05}3S\xb7\xff7\xbd\xe4*\xe1\xd5\x0f\xda"
self.m_header += struct.pack("!L", 32) + b"\0"
def test_encrypt_small_rs(self):
with raises(ECEException) as ex:
ece.encrypt(
self.m_input,
version="aes128gcm",
key=self.m_key,
rs=1,
)
assert ex.value.message == "Record size too small"
def test_decrypt_small_rs(self):
header = os.urandom(16) + struct.pack("!L", 2) + b"\0"
with raises(ECEException) as ex:
ece.decrypt(
header + self.m_input,
version="aes128gcm",
key=self.m_key,
rs=1,
)
assert ex.value.message == "Record size too small"
def test_encrypt_bad_version(self):
with raises(ECEException) as ex:
ece.encrypt(
self.m_input,
version="bogus",
key=self.m_key,
)
assert ex.value.message == "Invalid version"
def test_decrypt_bad_version(self):
with raises(ECEException) as ex:
ece.decrypt(
self.m_input,
version="bogus",
key=self.m_key,
)
assert ex.value.message == "Invalid version"
def test_decrypt_bad_header(self):
with raises(ECEException) as ex:
ece.decrypt(
os.urandom(4),
version="aes128gcm",
key=self.m_key,
)
assert ex.value.message == "Could not parse the content header"
def test_encrypt_long_keyid(self):
with raises(ECEException) as ex:
ece.encrypt(
self.m_input,
version="aes128gcm",
key=self.m_key,
keyid=b64e(os.urandom(192)), # 256 bytes
)
assert ex.value.message == "keyid is too long"
def test_overlong_padding(self):
with raises(ECEException) as ex:
ece.decrypt(
self.m_header + b"\xbb\xc7\xb9ev\x0b\xf0f+\x93\xf4"
b"\xe5\xd6\x94\xb7e\xf0\xcd\x15\x9b(\x01\xa5",
version="aes128gcm",
key=b"d\xc7\x0ed\xa7%U\x14Q\xf2\x08\xdf\xba\xa0\xb9r",
keyid=b64e(os.urandom(192)), # 256 bytes
)
assert ex.value.message == "all zero record plaintext"
def test_bad_early_delimiter(self):
with raises(ECEException) as ex:
ece.decrypt(
self.m_header + b"\xb9\xc7\xb9ev\x0b\xf0\x9eB\xb1\x08C8u"
b"\xa3\x06\xc9x\x06\n\xfc|}\xe9R\x85\x91"
b"\x8bX\x02`\xf3"
+ b"E8z(\xe5%f/H\xc1\xc32\x04\xb1\x95\xb5N\x9ep\xd4\x0e<\xf3"
b"\xef\x0cg\x1b\xe0\x14I~\xdc",
version="aes128gcm",
key=b"d\xc7\x0ed\xa7%U\x14Q\xf2\x08\xdf\xba\xa0\xb9r",
keyid=b64e(os.urandom(192)), # 256 bytes
)
assert ex.value.message == "record delimiter != 1"
def test_bad_final_delimiter(self):
with raises(ECEException) as ex:
ece.decrypt(
self.m_header + b"\xba\xc7\xb9ev\x0b\xf0\x9eB\xb1\x08Ji"
b"\xe4P\x1b\x8dI\xdb\xc6y#MG\xc2W\x16",
version="aes128gcm",
key=b"d\xc7\x0ed\xa7%U\x14Q\xf2\x08\xdf\xba\xa0\xb9r",
keyid=b64e(os.urandom(192)), # 256 bytes
)
assert ex.value.message == "last record delimiter != 2"
def test_damage(self):
with raises(ECEException) as ex:
ece.decrypt(
self.m_header + b"\xbb\xc6\xb1\x1dF:~\x0f\x07+\xbe\xaaD"
b"\xe0\xd6.K\xe5\xf9]%\xe3\x86q\xe0}",
version="aes128gcm",
key=b"d\xc7\x0ed\xa7%U\x14Q\xf2\x08\xdf\xba\xa0\xb9r",
keyid=b64e(os.urandom(192)), # 256 bytes
)
assert ex.value.message == "Decryption error: InvalidTag()"
class TestEceIntegration(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self):
ece.keys = {}
ece.labels = {}
def tearDown(self):
ece.keys = {}
ece.labels = {}
def _rsoverhead(self, version):
if version == "aesgcm128":
return 1
if version == "aesgcm":
return 2
return 18
def _generate_input(self, minLen=0):
length = struct.unpack("!B", os.urandom(1))[0] + minLen
return os.urandom(length)
def encrypt_decrypt(self, input, encrypt_params, decrypt_params=None, version=None):
"""Run and encrypt/decrypt cycle on some test data
:param input: data for input
:type length: bytearray
:param encrypt_params: Dictionary of encryption parameters
:type encrypt_params: dict
:param decrypt_params: Optional dictionary of decryption parameters
:type decrypt_params: dict
:param version: Content-Type of the body, formulating encryption
:type enumerate("aes128gcm", "aesgcm", "aesgcm128"):
"""
if decrypt_params is None:
decrypt_params = encrypt_params
logbuf("Input", input)
if "key" in encrypt_params:
logbuf("Key", encrypt_params["key"])
if version != "aes128gcm":
salt = os.urandom(16)
decrypt_rs_default = 4096
else:
salt = None
decrypt_rs_default = None
logbuf("Salt", salt)
if "auth_secret" in encrypt_params:
logbuf("Auth Secret", encrypt_params["auth_secret"])
encrypted = ece.encrypt(
input,
salt=salt,
key=encrypt_params.get("key"),
keyid=encrypt_params.get("keyid"),
dh=encrypt_params.get("dh"),
private_key=encrypt_params.get("private_key"),
auth_secret=encrypt_params.get("auth_secret"),
rs=encrypt_params.get("rs", 4096),
version=version,
)
logbuf("Encrypted", encrypted)
decrypted = ece.decrypt(
encrypted,
salt=salt,
key=decrypt_params.get("key"),
keyid=decrypt_params.get("keyid"),
dh=decrypt_params.get("dh"),
private_key=decrypt_params.get("private_key"),
auth_secret=decrypt_params.get("auth_secret"),
rs=decrypt_params.get("rs", decrypt_rs_default),
version=version,
)
logbuf("Decrypted", decrypted)
assert input == decrypted
def use_explicit_key(self, version=None):
params = {
"key": os.urandom(16),
}
self.encrypt_decrypt(self._generate_input(), params, version=version)
def auth_secret(self, version):
params = {"key": os.urandom(16), "auth_secret": os.urandom(16)}
self.encrypt_decrypt(self._generate_input(), params, version=version)
def exactly_one_record(self, version=None):
input = self._generate_input(1)
params = {"key": os.urandom(16), "rs": len(input) + self._rsoverhead(version)}
self.encrypt_decrypt(input, params, version=version)
def detect_truncation(self, version):
if version == "aes128gcm":
return
input = self._generate_input(2)
key = os.urandom(16)
salt = os.urandom(16)
rs = len(input) + self._rsoverhead(version) - 1
encrypted = ece.encrypt(input, salt=salt, key=key, rs=rs, version=version)
if version == "aes128gcm":
chunk = encrypted[0 : 21 + rs]
else:
chunk = encrypted[0 : rs + 16]
with raises(ECEException) as ex:
ece.decrypt(chunk, salt=salt, key=key, rs=rs, version=version)
assert ex.value.message == "Message truncated"
def use_dh(self, version):
def pubbytes(k):
return k.public_key().public_bytes(
Encoding.X962, PublicFormat.UncompressedPoint
)
def privbytes(k):
d = k.private_numbers().private_value
b = b""
for i in range(0, k.private_numbers().public_numbers.curve.key_size, 32):
b = struct.pack("!L", (d >> i) & 0xFFFFFFFF) + b
return b
def logec(s, k):
logbuf(s + " private", privbytes(k))
logbuf(s + " public", pubbytes(k))
def is_uncompressed(k):
b1 = pubbytes(k)[0:1]
assert struct.unpack("B", b1)[0] == 4, "is an uncompressed point"
# the static key is used by the receiver
static_key = make_key()
is_uncompressed(static_key)
logec("receiver", static_key)
# the ephemeral key is used by the sender
ephemeral_key = make_key()
is_uncompressed(ephemeral_key)
logec("sender", ephemeral_key)
auth_secret = os.urandom(16)
if version != "aes128gcm":
decrypt_dh = pubbytes(ephemeral_key)
else:
decrypt_dh = None
encrypt_params = {
"private_key": ephemeral_key,
"dh": static_key.public_key(),
"auth_secret": auth_secret,
}
decrypt_params = {
"private_key": static_key,
"dh": decrypt_dh,
"auth_secret": auth_secret,
}
self.encrypt_decrypt(
self._generate_input(), encrypt_params, decrypt_params, version
)
def test_types(self):
for ver in ["aes128gcm", "aesgcm", "aesgcm128"]:
for f in (
self.use_dh,
self.use_explicit_key,
self.auth_secret,
self.exactly_one_record,
self.detect_truncation,
):
ece.keys = {}
ece.labels = {}
f(version=ver)
class TestNode(unittest.TestCase):
"""Testing using data from the node.js version."""
def setUp(self):
if not os.path.exists(TEST_VECTORS):
self.skipTest("No %s file found" % TEST_VECTORS)
f = open(TEST_VECTORS, "r")
self.legacy_data = json.loads(f.read())
f.close()
def _run(self, mode):
if mode == "encrypt":
func = ece.encrypt
local = "sender"
inp = "input"
outp = "encrypted"
else:
func = ece.decrypt
local = "receiver"
inp = "encrypted"
outp = "input"
for data in self.legacy_data:
logmsg("%s: %s" % (mode, data["test"]))
p = data["params"][mode]
if "pad" in p and mode == "encrypt":
# This library doesn't pad in exactly the same way.
continue
if "keys" in data:
key = None
decode_pub = ec.EllipticCurvePublicNumbers.from_encoded_point
pubnum = decode_pub(ec.SECP256R1(), b64d(data["keys"][local]["public"]))
d = 0
dbin = b64d(data["keys"][local]["private"])
for i in range(0, len(dbin), 4):
d = (d << 32) + struct.unpack("!L", dbin[i : i + 4])[0]
privnum = ec.EllipticCurvePrivateNumbers(d, pubnum)
private_key = privnum.private_key(default_backend())
else:
key = b64d(p["key"])
private_key = None
if "authSecret" in p:
auth_secret = b64d(p["authSecret"])
else:
auth_secret = None
if "dh" in p:
dh = b64d(p["dh"])
else:
dh = None
result = func(
b64d(data[inp]),
salt=b64d(p["salt"]),
key=key,
dh=dh,
auth_secret=auth_secret,
keyid=p.get("keyid"),
private_key=private_key,
rs=p.get("rs", 4096),
version=p["version"],
)
assert b64d(data[outp]) == result
def test_decrypt(self):
self._run("decrypt")
def test_encrypt(self):
self._run("encrypt")