Benachrichtigungen: Web Push und E-Mail als Kanaele der Automatiken
Neuer BenachrichtigungTransport hinter der Aktor-URL "Benachrichtigung": push schickt an alle angemeldeten Geraete (homeMesh.push_abos), mail ueber den SMTP-Zugang aus der config.ini. Ein Abo, das der Push-Dienst mit 404 oder 410 ablehnt, wird geloescht statt weiter angeschrieben. Daneben hoert der Runner auf benachrichtigung/# - darueber schickt die Probe aus den Einstellungen, ohne dass die Weboberflaeche verschluesseln muesste. Zugestellt wird im Haupttakt, nicht im MQTT-Faden. pywebpush, py_vapid und http_ece liegen wie die uebrigen Fremdpakete im Ordner, nicht in site-packages; transports.py haengt ihn an den Suchpfad. Das Schluesselpaar erzeugt vapid_erzeugen.py und bleibt ausserhalb des Git. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Claude Opus 5
@@ -0,0 +1,434 @@
|
||||
import functools
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import struct
|
||||
|
||||
from cryptography.exceptions import InvalidTag
|
||||
from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
|
||||
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
|
||||
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.hkdf import HKDF
|
||||
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms, modes
|
||||
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import Encoding, PublicFormat
|
||||
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
|
||||
|
||||
MAX_RECORD_SIZE = pow(2, 31) - 1
|
||||
MIN_RECORD_SIZE = 3
|
||||
KEY_LENGTH = 16
|
||||
NONCE_LENGTH = 12
|
||||
TAG_LENGTH = 16
|
||||
|
||||
# Valid content types (ordered from newest, to most obsolete)
|
||||
versions = {
|
||||
"aes128gcm": {"pad": 1},
|
||||
"aesgcm": {"pad": 2},
|
||||
"aesgcm128": {"pad": 1},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class ECEException(Exception):
|
||||
"""Exception for ECE encryption functions"""
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, message):
|
||||
self.message = message
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def derive_key(
|
||||
mode, version, salt, key, private_key, dh, auth_secret, keyid, keylabel="P-256"
|
||||
):
|
||||
"""Derive the encryption key
|
||||
|
||||
:param mode: operational mode (encrypt or decrypt)
|
||||
:type mode: enumerate('encrypt', 'decrypt)
|
||||
:param salt: encryption salt value
|
||||
:type salt: str
|
||||
:param key: raw key
|
||||
:type key: str
|
||||
:param private_key: DH private key
|
||||
:type key: object
|
||||
:param dh: Diffie Helman public key value
|
||||
:type dh: str
|
||||
:param keyid: key identifier label
|
||||
:type keyid: str
|
||||
:param keylabel: label for aesgcm/aesgcm128
|
||||
:type keylabel: str
|
||||
:param auth_secret: authorization secret
|
||||
:type auth_secret: str
|
||||
:param version: Content Type identifier
|
||||
:type version: enumerate('aes128gcm', 'aesgcm', 'aesgcm128')
|
||||
|
||||
"""
|
||||
context = b""
|
||||
keyinfo = ""
|
||||
nonceinfo = ""
|
||||
|
||||
def build_info(base, info_context):
|
||||
return b"Content-Encoding: " + base + b"\0" + info_context
|
||||
|
||||
def derive_dh(mode, version, private_key, dh, keylabel):
|
||||
def length_prefix(key):
|
||||
return struct.pack("!H", len(key)) + key
|
||||
|
||||
if isinstance(dh, ec.EllipticCurvePublicKey):
|
||||
pubkey = dh
|
||||
dh = dh.public_bytes(Encoding.X962, PublicFormat.UncompressedPoint)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
pubkey = ec.EllipticCurvePublicKey.from_encoded_point(ec.SECP256R1(), dh)
|
||||
|
||||
encoded = private_key.public_key().public_bytes(
|
||||
Encoding.X962, PublicFormat.UncompressedPoint
|
||||
)
|
||||
if mode == "encrypt":
|
||||
sender_pub_key = encoded
|
||||
receiver_pub_key = dh
|
||||
else:
|
||||
sender_pub_key = dh
|
||||
receiver_pub_key = encoded
|
||||
|
||||
if version == "aes128gcm":
|
||||
context = b"WebPush: info\x00" + receiver_pub_key + sender_pub_key
|
||||
else:
|
||||
context = (
|
||||
keylabel.encode("utf-8")
|
||||
+ b"\0"
|
||||
+ length_prefix(receiver_pub_key)
|
||||
+ length_prefix(sender_pub_key)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return private_key.exchange(ec.ECDH(), pubkey), context
|
||||
|
||||
if version not in versions:
|
||||
raise ECEException("Invalid version")
|
||||
if mode not in ["encrypt", "decrypt"]:
|
||||
raise ECEException("unknown 'mode' specified: " + mode)
|
||||
if salt is None or len(salt) != KEY_LENGTH:
|
||||
raise ECEException("'salt' must be a 16 octet value")
|
||||
if dh is not None:
|
||||
if private_key is None:
|
||||
raise ECEException("DH requires a private_key")
|
||||
(secret, context) = derive_dh(
|
||||
mode=mode,
|
||||
version=version,
|
||||
private_key=private_key,
|
||||
dh=dh,
|
||||
keylabel=keylabel,
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
secret = key
|
||||
|
||||
if secret is None:
|
||||
raise ECEException("unable to determine the secret")
|
||||
|
||||
if version == "aesgcm":
|
||||
keyinfo = build_info(b"aesgcm", context)
|
||||
nonceinfo = build_info(b"nonce", context)
|
||||
elif version == "aesgcm128":
|
||||
keyinfo = b"Content-Encoding: aesgcm128"
|
||||
nonceinfo = b"Content-Encoding: nonce"
|
||||
elif version == "aes128gcm":
|
||||
keyinfo = b"Content-Encoding: aes128gcm\x00"
|
||||
nonceinfo = b"Content-Encoding: nonce\x00"
|
||||
if dh is None:
|
||||
# Only mix the authentication secret when using DH for aes128gcm
|
||||
auth_secret = None
|
||||
|
||||
if auth_secret is not None:
|
||||
if version == "aes128gcm":
|
||||
info = context
|
||||
else:
|
||||
info = build_info(b"auth", b"")
|
||||
hkdf_auth = HKDF(
|
||||
algorithm=hashes.SHA256(),
|
||||
length=32,
|
||||
salt=auth_secret,
|
||||
info=info,
|
||||
backend=default_backend(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
secret = hkdf_auth.derive(secret)
|
||||
|
||||
hkdf_key = HKDF(
|
||||
algorithm=hashes.SHA256(),
|
||||
length=KEY_LENGTH,
|
||||
salt=salt,
|
||||
info=keyinfo,
|
||||
backend=default_backend(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
hkdf_nonce = HKDF(
|
||||
algorithm=hashes.SHA256(),
|
||||
length=NONCE_LENGTH,
|
||||
salt=salt,
|
||||
info=nonceinfo,
|
||||
backend=default_backend(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
return hkdf_key.derive(secret), hkdf_nonce.derive(secret)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def iv(base, counter):
|
||||
"""Generate an initialization vector."""
|
||||
if (counter >> 64) != 0:
|
||||
raise ECEException("Counter too big")
|
||||
(mask,) = struct.unpack("!Q", base[4:])
|
||||
return base[:4] + struct.pack("!Q", counter ^ mask)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def decrypt(
|
||||
content,
|
||||
salt=None,
|
||||
key=None,
|
||||
private_key=None,
|
||||
dh=None,
|
||||
auth_secret=None,
|
||||
keyid=None,
|
||||
keylabel="P-256",
|
||||
rs=4096,
|
||||
version="aes128gcm",
|
||||
):
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Decrypt a data block
|
||||
|
||||
:param content: Data to be decrypted
|
||||
:type content: str
|
||||
:param salt: Encryption salt
|
||||
:type salt: str
|
||||
:param key: local public key
|
||||
:type key: str
|
||||
:param private_key: DH private key
|
||||
:type key: object
|
||||
:param keyid: Internal key identifier for private key info
|
||||
:type keyid: str
|
||||
:param dh: Remote Diffie Hellman sequence (omit for aes128gcm)
|
||||
:type dh: str
|
||||
:param rs: Record size
|
||||
:type rs: int
|
||||
:param auth_secret: Authorization secret
|
||||
:type auth_secret: str
|
||||
:param version: ECE Method version
|
||||
:type version: enumerate('aes128gcm', 'aesgcm', 'aesgcm128')
|
||||
:return: Decrypted message content
|
||||
:rtype str
|
||||
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
def parse_content_header(content):
|
||||
"""Parse an aes128gcm content body and extract the header values.
|
||||
|
||||
:param content: The encrypted body of the message
|
||||
:type content: str
|
||||
|
||||
"""
|
||||
id_len = struct.unpack("!B", content[20:21])[0]
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"salt": content[:16],
|
||||
"rs": struct.unpack("!L", content[16:20])[0],
|
||||
"keyid": content[21 : 21 + id_len],
|
||||
"content": content[21 + id_len :],
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
def decrypt_record(key, nonce, counter, content):
|
||||
decryptor = Cipher(
|
||||
algorithms.AES(key),
|
||||
modes.GCM(iv(nonce, counter), tag=content[-TAG_LENGTH:]),
|
||||
backend=default_backend(),
|
||||
).decryptor()
|
||||
return decryptor.update(content[:-TAG_LENGTH]) + decryptor.finalize()
|
||||
|
||||
def unpad_legacy(data):
|
||||
pad_size = versions[version]["pad"]
|
||||
pad = functools.reduce(
|
||||
lambda x, y: x << 8 | y,
|
||||
struct.unpack("!" + ("B" * pad_size), data[0:pad_size]),
|
||||
)
|
||||
if pad_size + pad > len(data) or data[pad_size : pad_size + pad] != (
|
||||
b"\x00" * pad
|
||||
):
|
||||
raise ECEException("Bad padding")
|
||||
return data[pad_size + pad :]
|
||||
|
||||
def unpad(data, last):
|
||||
i = len(data) - 1
|
||||
for i in range(len(data) - 1, -1, -1):
|
||||
v = struct.unpack("B", data[i : i + 1])[0]
|
||||
if v != 0:
|
||||
if not last and v != 1:
|
||||
raise ECEException("record delimiter != 1")
|
||||
if last and v != 2:
|
||||
raise ECEException("last record delimiter != 2")
|
||||
return data[0:i]
|
||||
raise ECEException("all zero record plaintext")
|
||||
|
||||
if version not in versions:
|
||||
raise ECEException("Invalid version")
|
||||
|
||||
overhead = versions[version]["pad"]
|
||||
if version == "aes128gcm":
|
||||
try:
|
||||
content_header = parse_content_header(content)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
raise ECEException("Could not parse the content header")
|
||||
salt = content_header["salt"]
|
||||
rs = content_header["rs"]
|
||||
keyid = content_header["keyid"]
|
||||
if private_key is not None and not dh:
|
||||
dh = keyid
|
||||
else:
|
||||
keyid = keyid.decode("utf-8")
|
||||
content = content_header["content"]
|
||||
overhead += 16
|
||||
|
||||
(key_, nonce_) = derive_key(
|
||||
"decrypt",
|
||||
version=version,
|
||||
salt=salt,
|
||||
key=key,
|
||||
private_key=private_key,
|
||||
dh=dh,
|
||||
auth_secret=auth_secret,
|
||||
keyid=keyid,
|
||||
keylabel=keylabel,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if rs <= overhead:
|
||||
raise ECEException("Record size too small")
|
||||
chunk = rs
|
||||
if version != "aes128gcm":
|
||||
chunk += 16 # account for tags in old versions
|
||||
if len(content) % chunk == 0:
|
||||
raise ECEException("Message truncated")
|
||||
|
||||
result = b""
|
||||
counter = 0
|
||||
try:
|
||||
for i in list(range(0, len(content), chunk)):
|
||||
data = decrypt_record(key_, nonce_, counter, content[i : i + chunk])
|
||||
if version == "aes128gcm":
|
||||
last = (i + chunk) >= len(content)
|
||||
result += unpad(data, last)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
result += unpad_legacy(data)
|
||||
counter += 1
|
||||
except InvalidTag as ex:
|
||||
raise ECEException("Decryption error: {}".format(repr(ex)))
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def encrypt(
|
||||
content,
|
||||
salt=None,
|
||||
key=None,
|
||||
private_key=None,
|
||||
dh=None,
|
||||
auth_secret=None,
|
||||
keyid=None,
|
||||
keylabel="P-256",
|
||||
rs=4096,
|
||||
version="aes128gcm",
|
||||
):
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Encrypt a data block
|
||||
|
||||
:param content: block of data to encrypt
|
||||
:type content: str
|
||||
:param salt: Encryption salt
|
||||
:type salt: str
|
||||
:param key: Encryption key data
|
||||
:type key: str
|
||||
:param private_key: DH private key
|
||||
:type key: object
|
||||
:param keyid: Internal key identifier for private key info
|
||||
:type keyid: str
|
||||
:param dh: Remote Diffie Hellman sequence
|
||||
:type dh: str
|
||||
:param rs: Record size
|
||||
:type rs: int
|
||||
:param auth_secret: Authorization secret
|
||||
:type auth_secret: str
|
||||
:param version: ECE Method version
|
||||
:type version: enumerate('aes128gcm', 'aesgcm', 'aesgcm128')
|
||||
:return: Encrypted message content
|
||||
:rtype str
|
||||
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
def encrypt_record(key, nonce, counter, buf, last):
|
||||
encryptor = Cipher(
|
||||
algorithms.AES(key),
|
||||
modes.GCM(iv(nonce, counter)),
|
||||
backend=default_backend(),
|
||||
).encryptor()
|
||||
|
||||
if version == "aes128gcm":
|
||||
data = encryptor.update(buf + (b"\x02" if last else b"\x01"))
|
||||
else:
|
||||
data = encryptor.update((b"\x00" * versions[version]["pad"]) + buf)
|
||||
data += encryptor.finalize()
|
||||
data += encryptor.tag
|
||||
return data
|
||||
|
||||
def compose_aes128gcm(salt, content, rs, keyid):
|
||||
"""Compose the header and content of an aes128gcm encrypted
|
||||
message body
|
||||
|
||||
:param salt: The sender's salt value
|
||||
:type salt: str
|
||||
:param content: The encrypted body of the message
|
||||
:type content: str
|
||||
:param rs: Override for the content length
|
||||
:type rs: int
|
||||
:param keyid: The keyid to use for this message
|
||||
:type keyid: str
|
||||
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if len(keyid) > 255:
|
||||
raise ECEException("keyid is too long")
|
||||
header = salt
|
||||
if rs > MAX_RECORD_SIZE:
|
||||
raise ECEException("Too much content")
|
||||
header += struct.pack("!L", rs)
|
||||
header += struct.pack("!B", len(keyid))
|
||||
header += keyid
|
||||
return header + content
|
||||
|
||||
if version not in versions:
|
||||
raise ECEException("Invalid version")
|
||||
|
||||
if salt is None:
|
||||
salt = os.urandom(16)
|
||||
|
||||
(key_, nonce_) = derive_key(
|
||||
"encrypt",
|
||||
version=version,
|
||||
salt=salt,
|
||||
key=key,
|
||||
private_key=private_key,
|
||||
dh=dh,
|
||||
auth_secret=auth_secret,
|
||||
keyid=keyid,
|
||||
keylabel=keylabel,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
overhead = versions[version]["pad"]
|
||||
if version == "aes128gcm":
|
||||
overhead += 16
|
||||
end = len(content)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
end = len(content) + 1
|
||||
if rs <= overhead:
|
||||
raise ECEException("Record size too small")
|
||||
chunk_size = rs - overhead
|
||||
|
||||
result = b""
|
||||
counter = 0
|
||||
|
||||
# the extra one on the loop ensures that we produce a padding only
|
||||
# record if the data length is an exact multiple of the chunk size
|
||||
for i in list(range(0, end, chunk_size)):
|
||||
result += encrypt_record(
|
||||
key_, nonce_, counter, content[i : i + chunk_size], (i + chunk_size) >= end
|
||||
)
|
||||
counter += 1
|
||||
if version == "aes128gcm":
|
||||
if keyid is None and private_key is not None:
|
||||
kid = private_key.public_key().public_bytes(
|
||||
Encoding.X962, PublicFormat.UncompressedPoint
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
kid = (keyid or "").encode("utf-8")
|
||||
return compose_aes128gcm(salt, result, rs, keyid=kid)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user